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I. INTRODUCTION 
With a letter signed by more than 300 civil society groups in tow, 
demonstrators descended on the World Bank’s headquarters in 
Washington, D.C. on a spring morning last year to protest an 
investment arbitration initiated by a Canadian mining company 
against the government of El Salvador. The demonstrators accused 
the mining company of using the arbitral process to “subvert a 
democratic nationwide debate over mining and environmental 
health.”1 According to the investors, the dispute concerns the non-
issuance of a concession because of a de facto moratorium on 
mining. The move was taken to allow the government to study the 
environmental impact of mining on, among other things, the 
country’s scarce water resources. This case is not an anomaly but 
rather exemplifies the growing number of investor-state disputes in 
which private business interests collide with public interest laws. 
Investment arbitration provides an international forum for foreign 
investors to air their grievances over governmental conduct that 
ostensibly contravenes a treaty obligation. Although the earliest 
investment disputes can be traced to the 1970s,2 most cases 
implicating environmental policies have only emerged in the last 
fifteen years.3 The emergence of environment-related disputes 
reflects shifting societal perceptions about the importance of 
 1.   Claire Provost, El Salvador Groups Accuse Pacific Rim of “Assault on 
Democratic Governance”, GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian. 
com/global-development/2014/apr/10/el-salvador-pacific-rim-assault-democratic-
governance. 
 2.  See INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVEST. DISPUTES, THE ICSID 
CASELOAD – STATISTICS 7-8 (2014), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ 
ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSD%20Web%20Stats%202014-2%20 
(English).pdf (identifying nine ICSID cases registered in the 1970s, a fraction of 
the annual ICSID cases since the late 1990s). 
 3.  See JORGE E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-18 (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2012) 
(explaining that only four investment disputes with environmental components 
occurred prior to the year 2000). 
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sustainable development. Disputes have sometimes arisen when a 
government’s environmental policies have negatively affected an 
investor’s bottom-line. 
Given the breadth of environmental regulation, these cases 
covered an array of industrial sectors and involved governmental 
actions aimed at combating pollution, conserving natural resources, 
and protecting fragile ecosystems and endangered species. Alarm set 
in amongst public interest groups as States were hauled before 
international tribunals for denying permits to operate landfills,4 
prohibiting the manufacture of toxic chemicals,5 refusing to grant 
licenses for water extraction,6 disallowing mining activities,7 tackling 
 4.  See, e.g., Gallo v. Canada, PCA Case No. 55798, Award, ¶ 121 
(Permanent Court of Arbitration 2011), http://www.international.gc.ca/ (revocation 
of mine-site waste disposal approval); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 39, 139, 144, 
147, 149 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 158 (2004) (rejection of landfill 
renewal authorization); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, at 99-100 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. FILJ 165 
(2001) (rejection of construction permit for a landfill). 
 5.  See, e.g., Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Canada, Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 1, 
3b-c (UNCITRAL 2011) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (restrictions on the sale and use of 
pesticide); Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶¶ 11-13  (UNCITRAL 2010) 
(Kluwer Law Int’l) (lindane-treated food product ban); Methanex Corp. v. United 
States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part II Ch. D ¶ 2  
(UNCITRAL 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf 
(methanol-based gasoline mixture ban); S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award 
on Liability, ¶¶ 127-28 (UNCITRAL Nov. 13, 2000) (Kluwer Law Int’l) 
(industrial waste transport prohibition); Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶ 5 
(UNCITRAL June 24, 1998) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (unleaded gasoline mixture ban). 
 6.  See, e.g., Sun Belt Water, Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a 
Claim to Arbitration, ¶¶ 4, 13, 16 (UNCITRAL 1998), http://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com (explaining claimant’s argument that respondent’s 
moratorium on water exports was intended to favor domestic investors over 
foreign ones). 
 7.  See, e.g., Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, ¶ 1.8 
(June 1, 2012) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (discussing arbitral proceedings against El 
Salvador for refusing permits to a mining company); Clayton v. Canada, Notice of 
Arbitration, ¶¶ 10-11 (UNCITRAL 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/case-documents/italaw1143.pdf (explaining the claimant’s argument that 
Canada’s environmental assessment of a coastal quarry project was unfair, 
arbitrary, and discriminatory); see also Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award (Sept. 22, 2014) 
(adjudicating a claim by a mining company against Venezuela for its termination 
of mining concessions in an environmentally-sensitive area). 
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claims of environmental harm arising from oil extraction operations,8 
and halting tourist development projects in ecologically-sensitive 
locations.9 There is no slowdown of these disputes in sight. Indeed, a 
new generation of cases is on the horizon springing from shifts in 
governmental policies on renewable energy,10 fracking,11 
 8.  See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 
3-4 (UNCITRAL 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
ita0155_0.pdf (summarizing claimant’s grievance that Ecuador colluded with 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio litigation that seek damages and other 
remedies for environmental impacts in a former concession area). 
 9.  See, e.g., Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case Nos. 
ARB/08/1, ARB/09/20, Award, ¶¶ 191, 219, 223, 230, 234, 255, 258 (May 16, 
2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1052.pdf 
 (determining that, while Costa Rica had violated article 4(2) of its BIT with 
Germany by adjoining a wildlife refuge through its regulation of claimant’s 
property, the claimant failed to carry out its evidentiary burden for most of its 
claims); Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, ¶¶ 16-17, 81-82 (Feb. 17, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 
169 (2000) (finding for the claimant in a case which arose when Costa Rica 
expropriated property for ecological concerns that the claimant intended to develop 
as a resort). 
 10.  See, e.g., Vattenfall AB v. Fed. Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/12/12, Decision Pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rules 41(5) (July 2, 2013), 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20130704_2 (commenting on the pending 
status of an arbitration based on Germany’s decision to phase out the use of 
nuclear power plants in the country); Mercer Int’l Inc. v. Government of Can., 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/3, Request for Arbitration, ¶¶ 24-25 (Apr. 30, 2012), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1508.pdf (asserting that 
Canada violated its obligations under NAFTA by unreasonably regulating the 
production of energy from biofuels, specifically wood pulp); AES Solar v. Spain, 
Decision on Bifurcation (UNCITRAL 2013), http://iareporter.com/articles/201306 
17_1 (reporting on investor’s claim that 2010 cuts to tariffs paid to solar energy 
producers were contrary to earlier commitments of the Spanish government and its 
obligations under the Energy Charter Treaty); Windstream Energy LLC v. Canada, 
Amended Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 12, 22, 31-32, 36 (UNCITRAL 2013), 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com (alleging that Canada, through 
the actions of the Government of Ontario opposing a wind energy feed-in tariff 
contract, acted inconsistently with its obligations under Chapter 11 of NAFTA); 
Mesa Power Grp., LLC v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 6, 46-48 (UNCITRAL 
2011), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com (asserting the 
Government of Ontario applied arbitrary and unfair rules for awarding FIT 
Program contracts that hinder the ability for wind energy production); see also 
Dutch Affiliates of US Energy Company, NextEra, Are the Latest to Sue Spain at 
ICSID, IA REPORTER (May 27, 2014), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/2014052 
71/print (stating that Dutch affiliates of the U.S. solar energy company, NextEra, 
had filed an arbitration claim against Spain with ICSID for charges resulting from 
Spain’s investment incentive roll-back and became one of many other companies 
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biodiversity,12 and climate change mitigation.13 
Environment-related disputes by their nature involve a tension 
and, at times, a direct conflict between competing obligations of the 
State to, on one hand, promote foreign investment and, on the other 
hand, protect its population and territory from environmental harm 
while responsibly managing its natural resources. States face the 
challenge of reconciling these competing demands—a task made 
even more formidable by its international investment commitments. 
Expanding on themes developed at the American University 
International Law Review Symposium,14 this article explores to what 
extent investor-state arbitration is equipped to deal with 
environment-related disputes. Section II analyzes the treaties 
themselves and classifies the main types of environmental clauses 
most commonly found in bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”). The 
article then examines how environmental disputes have been 
resolved in investor-State arbitrations to date in Section III. Section 
IV provides an appraisal of the main challenges of adjudicating 
environmental disputes and suggests ways to make investment 
arbitration more responsive to environmental concerns. Section V 
assesses the prospects for managing environmental concerns through 
investment arbitration. In short, the article concludes that to ensure 
greater support from both the users and observers of the system, 
investor-state arbitration could be more sensitive to environmental 
to do so). 
 11.  See, e.g., Lone Pine Res. Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 11-12 
(UNCITRAL 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita 
law1596.pdf (arguing that Lone Pine was unfairly denied the “valuable right to 
mine for oil and gas” through the process of fracking without due process, 
compensation, or cognizable public purpose). 
 12.  See, e.g., Myanmar’s Foreign Investment Law 2012 (designating 
businesses for “farming agriculture,” “breeding,” and “Marine Fisheries” as 
restricted or prohibited activities). 
 13.  See generally Kate Miles, Arbitrating Climate Change: Regulatory 
Regimes and Investor-State Disputes, 1 CLIMATE L. 76 (2010) (“It is the 
emergence of this approach in investor-state arbitral jurisprudence that causes 
concern for the implementation of new environmental protection measures, 
including new climate change mitigation regulation.”). 
 14.  One of the authors participated as a panelist in the American University 
International Law Review’s 2014 Symposium: Managing the Global Environment 
Through Trade: WTO, TPP and TTIP Negotiations, and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Versus Regional Trade Agreements, that took place on February 18, 2014. 
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policy concerns through the invocation of various procedural, 
evidentiary, and conceptual tools. 
II. CURRENT STATUS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
CLAUSES IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT AND 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
International investment agreements, such as bilateral investment 
treaties and investment chapters in regional trade agreements, 
provide the legal basis for investor-state claims by defining the 
contours of a State’s consent to arbitrate.15 These agreements 
typically set out procedural preconditions for submitting a claim, the 
substantive obligations owed by the contracting states to a foreign 
investor, and remedies available in the event of a breach. The text of 
investment agreements is therefore a logical starting point to analyze 
the legal basis for arbitral tribunals to balance a State’s 
environmental policy concerns with its investment protection 
commitments. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
recently conducted a survey of international investment agreements 
to catalogue environmental references and made three important 
observations.16 First, most BITs do not contain language referring to 
environmental concerns (they are found in just 6.5 percent of these 
treaties), but such references are more common in free trade 
agreements.17 Second, while environmental language has appeared in 
BITs since the mid-1980s, language relating to environmental 
concerns became more common in recent BITs.18 In fact, nearly half 
 15.  See, e.g., Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/1, Award, ¶ 168 (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com (explaining that state consent provides the foundation of the 
arbitration proceedings that arise from treaty commitments). 
 16.  Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Environmental Concerns in 
International Investment Agreements: A Survey 5 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & 
Dev. Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Working Paper No. 2011/01, 2011) (providing 
that its study was based on environmental concerns that appear in a sample of 
1,623 international investment agreements across forty-nine countries). 
 17.  Id. (emphasis omitted) (“Language referring to environmental concerns is 
rare in BITs but common in non-BIT IIAs. In the treaty sample, 133, or 8.2 
[percent], of the IIAs contain a reference to environmental concerns. All 30 non-
BIT IIAs contain such references, but only 6.5 [percent] of BITs do.”). 
 18.  Id. (explaining that environmental language appeared in a BIT for the first 
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of new treaties concluded since 2005 reference the environment in 
some way. Third, countries vary widely in the content and custom of 
including such language.19 
Since the scope and content of protections vary from treaty to 
treaty, a complete taxonomy of environment-related provisions is 
impractical. Furthermore, the language used in a specific investment 
agreement must be analyzed according to general principles of treaty 
interpretation to properly determine its legal significance. With that 
said, general observations can be made regarding the classes of 
environment-related provisions typically found in investment 
agreements. These provisions broadly reflect three main themes, 
each demonstrating the distinct policy goals of the contracting 
parties: (1) to recognize environmental protection as a treaty 
objective; (2) to preserve the right of States to regulate 
environmental matters; and (3) to ensure the continuing duty of 
States to enforce and promote environmental protection measures. 
The first set of references recognizes environmental protection and 
conservation amongst the treaty’s objectives. These references 
comprise the second most common category of environmental 
language.20 Often this type of language is in the treaty’s preamble.21 
The preamble of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT illustrates this point: 
“Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the 
protection of health, safety, and the environment.”22 
Although these clauses do not typically prescribe a hierarchy of 
legal obligations, they serve a useful function by confirming that 
environmental protection is a concern of the parties. General 
principles of treaty interpretation recognize the role of preambles. 
According to article 31(1)(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, the preamble provides context for interpretation and may 
time in 1985 between China-Singapore and sparked a trend which would lead to a 
fifty percent increase of such provisions by 2005). 
 19.  Id. at 9-10 (noting that environmental references are most commonly 
found in BITs from Canada, New Zealand, Japan, United States, and Finland). 
 20.  Id. at 11. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE pmbl. (2012), www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20 
for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. 
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provide background on the object and purpose of the treaty.23 In 
practice, foreign investment decisions at times de-emphasize 
preamble clauses when identifying the object and purpose of a 
treaty.24 One commentator surmises that this may occur when the 
object and purpose of the treaty is obvious or the preamble is poorly 
drafted.25 It may also reflect the differing legal cultures from which 
arbitrators are drawn; for example, an adjudicator hailing from a civil 
law culture may be more likely to view the treaty text, including the 
preamble, holistically. Nevertheless, the fact remains that preamble 
clauses may provide a useful starting point in this analysis. 
The second category of provisions affirms a contracting party’s 
right to regulate environmental matters. This is the oldest and most 
common category of environmental language.26 These provisions 
vary widely in scope and may be framed as exceptions, exclusions, 
or carve-outs. For example, some international investment treaties 
adopt language similar to article XX of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) excepting measures taken for reasons of 
“human, animal or plant life or health,”27 “conservation of 
 23.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(2), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that States interpret treaties in the full context of a 
given treaty’s preamble and annexes, as well as any collateral agreements the 
respective parties may have signed); see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY 
LAW AND PRACTICE 336-37 (2000) (stating that drafters often use preamble 
language to mollify opponents of a majority view and accordingly drafters must 
keep in mind article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to ensure 
preambles are not inconsistent with substantive provisions of a treaty); RICHARD 
GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 186 (2008) (arguing that treaty preambles 
help identify the object and purpose of a treaty). 
 24.  See, e.g., Philip Morris Brands SARL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 201 (July 2, 2013), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action 
Val=showDoc&docId=DC3592_En&caseId=C1000 (“The Preamble therefore 
does not materially advance analysis. Likewise, the reference in the Preamble . . . 
appears too general to permit the drawing of definitive conclusions regarding the 
need for the investment to contribute to the host state’s economic development.”). 
 25.  J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION ¶ 3.80 (2012). 
 26.  Gordon & Pohl, supra note 16, at 11 (“Use of this category of language 
began in 1985, and is therefore among the oldest categories of language.”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments art. XVII(3)(b), Can.-Egypt, Nov. 13, 1996. 
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exhaustible natural resources,”28 or “protection of national treasures 
of artistic, historic or archaeological value.”29 
Treaties commonly include a more general policy space clause, 
such as those included in the Canada, United States, and Norway 
Model BITs.30 An example of a broad policy space clause can be 
found in article III(1) of Annex I of the Canada-Costa Rica Foreign 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement: “[n]othing in this 
Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this 
Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment 
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns.”31 
 28.  Bilateral Investment Treaty Between the Government of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the Republic of Singapore art. 18(e), 
Jordan-Sing., May 16, 2004 (Kluwer Law Int’l). 
 29.  Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Peru for the Liberalization, 
Promotion, and Protection of Investment art. 19(1)(f), Japan-Peru, Nov. 22, 2008 
(Kluwer Law Int’l). 
 30.  See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22, art. 12(5) 
(“Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it 
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is 
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”); Canada Model 
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, INV. TREATY 
ARBITRATION art. 10(1) (2004), http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-
model-en.pdf 1/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Canada Model BIT] 
(emphasizing that parties are entitled to take reasonable actions to protect 
ecological resources); Norway Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Draft Version 191207), INV. TREATY ARBITRATION art. 12, 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1031.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 
2015) [hereinafter Norway Model BIT] (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure 
that investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or 
environmental concerns.”). 
 31.  Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Republic of Costa Rica for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. III(1) 
of Annex I, Can.-Costa Rica, Mar. 18, 1998, available at http://www.treaty-
accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=101533; see North American Free Trade 
Agreement art. 1114(1), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) 
[hereinafter NAFTA] (emphasis omitted); see also The Dominican Republic-
Central American Free Trade Agreement, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE art. 10.11 
(2007), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset 
uploadfile328_4718.pdf [hereinafter CAFTA-DR] (ensuring States can take 
“appropriate” measures to ensure investors conduct themselves in a “sensitive” 
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These clauses intend to carve out regulatory space for States to 
achieve policy goals without breaching their substantive obligations. 
A state party that invokes such a provision bears the burden of 
proving that the exception applies and the relevant criteria are 
satisfied.32 If successfully invoked, the exception may obviate the 
State’s obligation to pay compensation for the offending conduct. 
However, how tribunals will interpret these clauses is uncertain. To 
date, investment tribunals have generally interpreted other exception 
clauses restrictively.33 One reason for this might be the “otherwise 
consistent with this Agreement” language, which arbitrators could 
read to weaken these policy space clauses.34 Looking ahead, 
investment tribunals interpreting reservations may borrow from 
analogous legal constructs, such as the customary law plea of 
necessity,35 non-precluded measure exceptions,36 or the analytical 
manner regarding environmental issues); Gordon & Pohl, supra note 16, at 11 
(concluding that provisions ensuring a contracting parties’ right to “[reserve] 
environmental policy space” are one of the most common provisions found across 
a sample of several treaties). 
 32.  See Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International Investment 
Agreements, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 355, 
362-63 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011). 
 33.  Id. at 361; see also Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 373 (Sept. 28, 2007), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC694
_En&caseId=C8 (stating that parties cannot interpret treaties to use policy space 
provisions as an “escape route” from obligations to which they are normally bound 
under a treaty); Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 331 (May 22, 2007) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (limiting 
the object and purpose of article 11 of the United States and Argentinean 
investment treaty to specific situations involving economic “difficulty and 
hardship” and requiring that it should be narrowly interpreted). 
 34.  But see Gordon & Pohl, supra note 16, at 21 (citing NAFTA and stating 
that many treaties include policy space provisions that allow those States to take 
otherwise prohibited actions without facing sanctions). 
 35.  See VIÑUALES, supra note 3, at 384 (observing that in evaluating claims of 
GATT violations, WTO tribunals are more frequently interpreting the doctrine of 
“necessity” liberally). 
 36.  See generally William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment 
Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-
Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 
307, 311-13 (2008) (discussing the increasing prevalence of non-precluded 
measure provisions, which allow States to take actions otherwise prohibited by 
treaty obligations when such actions are taken in pursuit of expressly permitted 
public policy purposes). 
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approach of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),37 depending on 
the precise wording of the relevant provision. 
A subset of these provisions clarifies that certain regulatory action 
relating to environmental matters may not be the basis for a 
compensatory claim under the investment agreement. For example, 
some provisions carve out an exception for specific disciplines, such 
as performance requirements.38 A small number of Model BITs also 
establish that non-discriminatory measures designed to serve a public 
health, safety, or environmental protection objective do not constitute 
an indirect expropriation.39 Other treaties exclude environmental 
provisions altogether from application of the dispute settlement  
 
 37.  See generally Newcombe, supra note 32, at 363, 365 (explaining that the 
WTO Appellate Body follows a weighing and balancing analysis “of either 
restrictive or wide interpretation, in interpreting the meaning of ‘necessary’ for the 
purposes of the general exceptions in GATT,” rather than a strict formalistic 
approach). 
 38.  See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 7(2), Can.-Peru, Nov. 14, 2006, 
available at http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105078 (providing 
that measures that require investment to meet applicable health, safety or 
environmental requirements may be permissible forms of technology transfer); 
NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1106(2), (6) (assuring that state parties, except when 
they act in a “arbitrary or unjustifiable manner,” will ensure compliance with 
domestic regulations regarding health, public safety, and conservation policies); 
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22, art. 8(3)(c) (ensuring 
compliance with conservation measures for state parties so long as compliance is 
not affected in an “arbitrary or unjustifiable manner”). 
 39.  See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22, 
Annex B(4)(b) (“Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory 
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute 
indirect expropriations.”); CAFTA-DR, supra note 31, Annex 10-C(4)(b) 
(providing that “nondiscriminatory regulatory actions” aimed at safeguarding 
public health, safety, and the environment are not expropriatory); Canada Model 
BIT, supra note 30, Annex B.13(1)) (“[N]on-discriminatory measures of a Party 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such 
as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.”). 
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mechanism.40 These clauses typically have the most far-reaching 
effects.41 
Many treaties also place States under a continuing obligation to 
uphold environmental standards. Clauses that oblige States not to 
lower environmental regulations to attract foreign investments 
illustrate this third type of clause.42 These statements may be in the 
preamble43 or a free-standing clause. An example of the latter is 
article 23 of the Japan-Uzbekistan BIT: 
The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by investors of the other Contracting Party and of a non-
Contracting Party by relaxing its health, safety or environmental 
measures, or by lowering its labor standards. To this effect each 
Contracting Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from such 
measures and standards as an encouragement for the establishment, 
acquisition or expansion in its Area of investments by investors of the 
other Contracting Party and of a non-Contracting Party.44 
These provisions appear hortatory and aspirational in nature. Their 
aim is to avoid a regulatory race to the bottom by States. Sometimes 
these clauses are complemented with recourse to consultations 
 40.  See, e.g., Agreement Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union 
and the Republic of Colombia in the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments art. VII(5), Feb. 4, 2009, available at  http://www.kluwerarbitration. 
com.proxy.wcl.american.edu/CommonUI/document.aspx?id=KLI-KA-1322227-n 
(foreclosing dispute settlement mechanisms in relation to disputes involving 
environmental issues). 
 41.  But see Gordon & Pohl, supra note 16, at 20 (stating that only a handful of 
treaties include such provisions). 
 42.  Id. at 21. 
 43.  See Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between 
the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Republic of 
Armenia, preamble, Fin.-Arm., Oct. 5, 2004, 2431 U.N.T.S. 85 (“AGREEING that 
these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental 
measures of general application”). 
 44.  Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Uzbekistan for the 
Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment art. 23, Japan-Uzb., Aug. 
15, 2008, available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com.proxy.wcl.american.edu/ 
CommonUI/document.aspx?id=KLI-KA-1042201-n; see also NAFTA, supra note 
31, art. 1114(2) (allowing parties to request the other to abstain from encouraging 
investment by relaxing environmental regulations). But see 2012 U.S. Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22, art. 12(2) n.15 (recognizing that it 
would be “inappropriate” for the parties to waive or derogate from their own 
environmental regulation or law in an effort to encourage investment). 
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between the contracting states when one party is suspected of 
relaxing its standards.45 While they do not directly address the 
balance between investment protection obligations and 
environmental policy objectives, consultations potentially introduce 
a novel policing function for States to safeguard existing 
environmental standards. Although consultations have not been 
initiated for environmental matters, this procedure was invoked 
under an analogous provision of the Labor Chapter in the Dominican 
Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement by the United 
States against Guatemala. Although the parties initially reached an 
agreement, the United States subsequently announced that it was 
proceeding with its labor case against Guatemala because Guatemala 
failed to implement key actions under the plan.46 This case suggests a 
potentially useful role for consultations, particularly when coupled 
with a dispute settlement mechanism.47 
Given that the majority of investment agreements are silent on 
policy issues in general, including the environment, tribunals have 
not had to grapple with thorny questions of treaty interpretation. 
However, a tribunal confronted with such a provision should 
endeavor to apply general principles of treaty interpretation to the 
specific language of the treaty to give full effect to the parties’ 
intentions. For now, parties may be guided by the jurisprudence of 
 45.  These clauses are found in Canadian and U.S. Model BITs.  See, e.g., 2012 
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22, art. 12(6) (“A Party may 
make a written request for consultations with the other Party regarding any matter 
arising under this Article.”); Canada Model BIT, supra note 30, art.11 (“If a Party 
considers that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request 
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to 
avoiding any such encouragement.”). A similar provision is found in NAFTA and 
US-CAFTA-DR. See NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1114(2) (using language 
identical to the Canada Model BIT); CAFTA-DR, supra note 31, art. 17.10 
(allowing parties to request consultation for any matter considered by the treaty). 
 46.  In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under 
Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements/ 
guatemala-submission-under-cafta-dr (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 47.  See, e.g., Wolfgang Alschner & Elizabeth Tuerk, The Role of International 
Investment Agreements in Fostering Sustainable Development, in INVESTMENT 
LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES 217, 227 
(Freya Baetens ed., 2013) (“Such an institutional mechanism facilitates 
consultations over CSR, allows the adjustment of CSR policies over time, and 
helps to prevent CSR-related misunderstandings and disputes.”). 
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investment treaty cases on environment-related disputes, a topic 
discussed in the next section. 
III. TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Since their emergence, environmental disputes have been highly 
controversial and deeply polarizing. At their core, these disputes 
involve States’ right to regulate for human health and environmental 
reasons. Investment tribunals tasked with deciding these cases have 
considered environmental issues as part of their factual analysis of 
the claim rather than as questions of law. 
Factually, these cases are diverse and may challenge the scientific 
basis of an environmental policy or the validity of a regulatory 
decision taken for reasons of natural resource conservation or 
wildlife protection. However, it is rare—although not unheard of—
for an investor to complain about a State failing to apply its 
environmental laws in an investment treaty claim.48 States may also 
raise environmental considerations defensively to justify the 
reasonableness of the disputed regulatory action.49 In doing so, a 
State may describe the severity of an environmental issue, the 
rigorous internal processes or scientific analyses leading to the 
policy’s adoption, and global initiatives to combat the problem.  This 
information provides factual background that will usually bear on the 
 48.  The Allard v. Barbados case provides a notable example where a claimant 
argued that the host state violated domestic and international environmental norms. 
Allard v. Bardados, Notice of Dispute, ¶¶ 14, 16 (UNCITRAL, Sept. 8, 2009), 
http://graemehall.com/legal/index.htm. In 2009, Mr. Allard filed a notice of dispute 
under the Canada-Barbados FIPA with respect to his eco-tourism project. The 
Canadian investor claimed that he was forced to close the wetlands sanctuary due 
to certain acts and omissions by the Barbadian government. He claimed these 
actions violated the government’s domestic and international laws and amounted to 
an indirect expropriation and a failure to accord fair and equitable treatment to its 
investment. It bears mentioning that the breaches of environmental law were not 
made as independent claims but rather were used as evidence of treaty breaches. 
 49.  See Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and 
Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 
401, 435 (2014) (citing, as an example, a dispute between China and the European 
Union over Feed-In Tariffs, which is currently being resolved through 
consultations). 
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tribunal’s application of the relevant treaty provision, such as fair 
and equitable treatment. 
Environmental facts can be relevant to legal issues relating to 
jurisdiction, liability, and even damages, which this section will 
discuss in turn. With regard to jurisdiction, many bilateral investment 
treaties require Parties to make an investment in accordance with the 
host state’s laws for the investor to avail itself of the dispute 
settlement mechanism.50 Many arbitral tribunals have recognized that 
jurisdiction may be denied under this type of provision where the 
underlying investment failed to comply with domestic rules.51 
Although it remains untested, an investment made in violation of a 
host state’s environmental regulation could arguably fall outside the 
protection of the treaty depending on the nature and gravity of the 
violation. 
Analyzing environmental issues can also be relevant to the merits 
of the dispute. States have defended against environment-related 
challenges by explaining that a legitimate and rational basis for 
adopting the measure in question exists.52 In showing that a 
 50.  RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 84-88 (2008). 
 51.  See, e.g., Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 165 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com (agreeing with the parties that respondent’s domestic law 
prohibiting “corruption” fell within the subject-matter of the legality requirement 
under the relevant BIT); Quiborax S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 266 (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1098.pdf (finding 
that a claimant investor need only show that it had made the legally required 
investment to prove an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction); Desert Line Projects LLC 
v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶¶ 104-05 (Feb. 6, 
2008), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH& 
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC791_En&caseId=C62 (ruling against the 
 respondent by finding that it failed to prove that the claimant had not made the 
required investment or that such an investment had failed to comply with the 
respondent’s domestic laws). 
 52.  See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on 
Jurisdiction and Merits, Part IV Ch. D ¶ 7 (UNCITRAL 2005), http://www.state. 
gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf (“[A]s a matter of general international 
law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in 
accordance with due process and, which affects . . . a foreign investor or 
investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific 
commitments had been given . . . that the government would refrain from such 
regulation.”). 
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governmental action or regulation aims to combat a serious 
environmental concern, a State may show that the act was neither 
arbitrary nor discriminatory.53 Likewise, under the police powers 
doctrine,54 a State may not be found liable for a measure with an 
expropriatory effect so long as it was enacted in accordance with due 
process, for a public purpose such as sustainable development, and 
on a non-discriminatory basis.55 
When assessing the reasonableness of a particular measure, 
tribunals have often focused their analysis on several key issues. 
First, some tribunals have examined the State’s motives for adopting 
the measure in question to determine if the regulation constitutes a 
disguised protectionist measure. For example, in S.D. Myers Inc. v. 
Canada,56 the tribunal concluded that a ban on the export of 
polychlorinated biphenyls (in line with the Basel Convention) was 
designed in part to economically benefit the Canadian hazardous 
waste disposal industry.57 As a result, the measure was held to violate 
Canada’s obligations under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) against nationality-based discrimination.58 
Second, tribunals have focused on a measure’s effect on foreign 
investors to determine whether it was proportionate to the public 
interest requiring protection. In one such case, Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,59 the 
tribunal considered whether Mexico’s non-renewal of the investor’s 
permits to operate a landfill purportedly for environmental reasons 
 53.  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 14-15 (holding that, given the respondent’s scientific 
impetus for implementing the regulation at issue and the manner in which the 
regulation was promulgated, the claimant failed to show the respondent’s actions 
were discriminatory). 
 54.  See infra Section IV.C.1. 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  Partial Award on Liability, ¶ 155 (UNCITRAL Nov. 13, 2000) (Kluwer 
Law Int’l) (stating that the “indirect motive” of ensuring the strength of local 
industry was “understandable,” but not a lawful means for ensuring Canada’s 
economic well-being). 
 57.  See id. ¶ 252 (determining whether the policy was impermissibly 
protectionist under NAFTA by assessing whether the measure created a policy 
favoring nationals over non-nationals). 
 58.  Id. ¶ 256. 
 59.  ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. 
FILJ 158 (2004). 
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was reasonably proportional.60 In the tribunal’s view, Mexico based 
its decision upon the community’s opposition to the landfill, which 
did not give rise to “a serious urgent situation, crisis, need or social 
emergency” that was proportionate to the deprivation of the 
investment’s economic value.61 
Third, the tribunal’s level of engagement with scientific evidence 
is relevant to its decision on the measure’s reasonableness.62 That is, 
the degree of deference accorded to the scientific determinations of 
State agencies reflects the willingness of tribunals to evaluate the 
robustness of this evidence. For example, in Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. 
United States,63 which involved a challenge to California’s 
mandatory backfilling regulation, the tribunal determined that it was 
inappropriate to apply domestic deference from national court 
systems.64 Rather, the tribunal considered the legal standard already 
accorded that deference.65 As such, it did not add to that standard.66 
Taking a slightly different approach, the tribunal in Chemtura Corp. 
v. Canada67 declined to consider whether the chemical lindane posed 
 60.  See id. ¶¶ 19, 49 (“The Respondent stresses the negative attitude of the 
community towards the landfill due to its location and to the negative and highly 
critical view taken by the community with regard to the way Cytrar performed its 
task of transporting and confining the hazardous toxic waste originating in the 
former lead recycling and recovery plant . . . which would highlight the importance 
of demanding strict compliance with the new permit granted”). 
 61.  See id. ¶¶ 139, 144, 151 (finding the respondent was engaged in an 
expropriation because the respondent failed to show any evidence that the landfill 
posed a real or potential threat to the environment or public health or that 
community backlash against the claimant was severe enough to warrant reneging 
on its obligations). 
 62.  See generally Céline Lévesque, Science in the Hands of International 
Investment Tribunals: A Case for ‘Scientific Due Process’, 20 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L 
L. 259, 277 (2009) (exploring the concept of “scientific due process” in order to 
suggest criteria that tribunals might consider when applying investment treaty 
standards); Marcos A. Orellana, The Role of Science in Investment Arbitrations 
Concerning Public Health and the Environment, 17 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 48, 49-
50 (2006) (arguing that a focus on scientific due process would relieve tribunals 
from deciding the truth of scientific claims). 
 63.  Award (UNCITRAL June 8, 2009) (Kluwer Law Int’l). 
 64.  See id. ¶ 617 (“The Tribunal disagrees that domestic deference in national 
court systems is necessarily applicable to international tribunals.”). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id.   
 67.  Award (UNCITRAL 2010) (Kluwer Law Int’l). 
 
  
400 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [30:3 
a danger to human health or the environment.68 The tribunal 
concluded that it was inappropriate for it to judge the correctness or 
adequacy of Canada’s pest management agency’s scientific 
determinations regarding the environmental and health risks 
associated with the pesticide.69 Instead, it considered the 
administrative process followed and global initiatives to ban the 
substance in assessing whether the agency conducted the scientific 
review as part of its regulatory mandate and its international 
commitments rather than as a result of a trade irritant.70 Accordingly, 
a tribunal that defers to the State on the scientific merits of a given 
policy will opt instead to evaluate the regulatory process followed by 
policymakers. 
The tribunal’s decision in Methanex Corp. v. United States71 
illustrates the weighing of these various factors.72 The case arose 
from California’s ban on the sale and use of the gasoline additive 
methyl tertiary-butyl ether (“MTBE”).73 Based on the findings of a 
research team at the University of California (“UC Report”)74 on the 
effects of MTBE, California policymakers determined that the 
chemical posed a risk to groundwater and drinking water due to 
leaking underground fuel storage tanks.75 Methanex, a large 
 68.  See id. ¶ 134 (“The Tribunal notes at the outset that it is not its task to 
determine whether certain uses of lindane are dangerous, whether in general or in 
the Canadian context . . . . [and it] is not to second-guess the correctness of the 
science-based decision-making of highly specialized national regulatory 
agencies.”). 
 69.  See id. ¶ 153 (adding that it cannot question the scientific findings of a 
government agency, even when divergence of opinions is expressed within the 
agency). 
 70.  See id. ¶ 137 (determining whether the ban was a “trade irritant” solely 
based on economic policies or whether it implements a legal commitment 
undertaken pursuant to the Aarhus Protocol to the United Nations Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention). 
 71.  Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part II Ch. D ¶ 2  
(UNCITRAL 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf. 
 72.  See, e.g., id. Part III Ch. B ¶ 57. 
 73.  Id. Part I Preface ¶ 1. 
 74.  The UC Report was a massive collaborative effort involving more than 
sixty researchers whose work spanned five volumes and consisted of seventeen 
papers. Id. Part III Ch. A, ¶ 3. 
 75.  See id. Part II Ch. D ¶ 15 (noting that, by California law and given the 
findings on MTBE, the Governor was required to either certify MTBE was 
hazardous to the public health or certify that it posed no health risks whatsoever). 
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Canadian producer of a component used to manufacture MTBE, 
brought a claim under NAFTA for $970 million for losses caused by 
the ban.76 The company argued that banning one component of 
reformulated gasoline but allowing other dangerous components was 
irrational and exposed California’s true motives to benefit the U.S. 
ethanol industry.77 The parties each presented expert witnesses to 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the UC Report.78 The award 
summarizes the administrative process followed, the main findings 
of the report, and the testimony of the parties’ experts. After 
weighing this evidence, the tribunal concluded that the UC Report 
reflected “a serious, objective and scientific approach to a complex 
problem.”79 Focusing on the scientific process, the tribunal surmised 
that the report was not a sham because it had been subject to an open 
and informed debate.80 Although the tribunal did not make a 
determination on the scientific merits of the UC Report, it stated that 
it was not persuaded that the report was scientifically incorrect.81 
Accordingly, the tribunal found that the California ban was a lawful 
regulation and did not amount to an expropriation.82 
Finally, a tribunal’s findings on environmental issues can in some 
cases limit an investor’s entitlement to compensation where a State 
has been found liable for breaching an investment obligation. For 
example, a State could argue that widespread adoption of an 
 76.  Id. Part I. 
 77.  See Methanex Corp., Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and 
Merits, Part II Ch. D ¶¶ 24-25 (discussing the claimant’s argument that California 
should have banned all USTs, rather than just MTBE, indicating an obvious bias 
existed and California’s decision was arbitrary). 
 78.  Id. Part III, Ch. A ¶ 41 (recognizing that expert reports went “to the heart 
of the question of whether the US measures . . . constitute[d] a sham environmental 
protection in order to cater to local political interests or in order to protect a 
domestic industry.”) (internal quotes omitted). 
 79.  Id. Part III Ch. A ¶ 101. 
 80.  See id. (“In particular, the UC Report was subjected at the time to public 
hearings, testimony and peer-review; and its emergence as a serious scientific work 
from such an open and informed debate is the best evidence that it was not the 
product of a political sham engineered by California”). 
 81.  Id. (acknowledging that it is “possible for other scientists and researchers 
to disagree in good faith with certain of its methodologies, analyses and 
conclusions”). 
 82.  See id. Part IV Ch. D ¶ 15 (concluding that California’s regulations were a 
legitimate exercise of its authority and not an expropriation because the regulations 
had a public purpose, were non-discriminatory, and subject to due process). 
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international environmental law would have limited the future 
profitability of the investment or would have made future profits 
entirely speculative.83 Chemtura Corp. illustrates this argument.84 
The claimant was a U.S. chemical manufacturer that challenged a 
Canadian federal measure that banned the application of lindane on 
canola, which had been the primary use of the pesticide. Chemtura 
argued that the Special Review, which was conducted by Canada’s 
Pest Management Regulatory Agency to assess the risks of lindane, 
was flawed. Canada’s scientific findings were consistent with many 
other countries’ findings that had also decided to phase out the use of 
lindane because of its risks to human health and the environment. In 
its defense, Canada presented evidence of national, regional, and 
international initiatives aimed at reducing and eliminating lindane.85 
Canada argued that Chemtura’s damages claim for lost future profits 
was limited or nil due to the loss of markets in the United States and 
elsewhere from the progressive ban of the chemical.86 Ultimately, the 
tribunal did not discuss damages, having dismissed all of Chemtura’s 
claims.87 
International investment treaty jurisprudence suggests that 
tribunals consider environmental issues as factual rather than legal 
matters. Because States often rely on environmental considerations 
to explain a measure’s legality and reasonableness, a tribunal’s 
findings on these factual issues will impact how it assesses whether 
the State has violated a treaty obligation. A tribunal’s findings on 
 83.  See, e.g., Southern Pac. Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award on the Merits, ¶¶ 188-91 (May 20, 
1992), 8 ICSID Rev. 328 (1993) (rejecting the claimant’s lost profits claim because 
the tourist development project was in its infancy at the date of breach and its lost 
sales would have been limited when Egypt registered the Pyramids Plateau under 
the UNESCO Convention). 
 84.  See generally  Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award,  (UNCITRAL Aug. 2, 
2010) (Kluwer Law Int’l). 
 85.  Lindane had been found to accumulate in human tissue, cause nervous 
system damage, and persist and bioconcentrate in various food chains. See id. ¶ 
135-36 (noting that, in addition to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants, which includes a provision that calls for eliminating the use of lindane, 
at least twenty-one States had banned or restricted the use of lindane). 
 86.  See generally Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Canada’s Counter-Memorial, ¶¶ 
919, 1005 (UNCITRAL 2008) (arguing that the claim for lost profit was too 
speculative as other countries also were banning the substance). 
 87.  Chemtura Corp., Award, Part V. 
 
  
2015] GOING GREEN 403 
environmental facts can also be relevant to other legal 
determinations, such as jurisdiction and an investor’s entitlement to 
compensation as well as the quantum of damages owed. However, 
these decisions leave unanswered questions about evaluating 
government motives, conflicting scientific evidence, and the 
regulatory choices of States in implementing public policy 
objectives. In particular, the case law leaves open the fundamental 
question of the appropriate standard by which to review regulations 
addressing public health and the environment. In the following 
section, this article addresses these shortcomings and proposes 
potential ways that investment arbitration can be made more 
responsive to environmental concerns. 
IV. THE WAY FORWARD: MANAGING 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES MORE EFFECTIVELY 
IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
As investment treaty jurisprudence demonstrates, many challenges 
in adjudicating environmental disputes exist. First, most bilateral 
investment treaties do not reference substantive policy issues and 
thus tribunals have no guidance on how to weigh ecological aims of 
governmental measures.88 Including robust exception provisions in 
investment treaties may help tribunals to avoid examining and 
making value judgments on the legitimacy of State objectives and 
policy choices.89 Concomitantly, imposing obligations on States 
 88.  See generally Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A., ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 158 
(establishing that it is in the tribunal’s purview to weigh the reasonableness of a 
State’s regulation, while acknowledging the due deference owed to the State in 
defining its public policy); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 23 
(UNCITRAL June 8, 2009) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (holding that international 
tribunals do not necessarily need to afford deference to domestic decisions, as it is 
already reflected in the standard of review); S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Partial 
Award on Liability, ¶¶ 255, 263 (UNCITRAL Nov. 13, 2000) (Kluwer Law Int’l) 
(ruling against respondent on the grounds that, although ensuring the strength of 
domestic business was a legitimate state aim, the methods used amounted to 
expropriation and thus were impermissible under NAFTA). 
 89.  See generally 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22, 
Annex B(4)(b) (providing that non-discriminatory regulatory actions designed for 
legitimate “public welfare objectives” do not constitute indirect expropriations, 
except in “rare circumstances”); CAFTA-DR, supra note 31, Annex 10(C)(4)(b) 
(providing an identical policy space provision to the U.S. BIT); Canada Model 
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without any corresponding obligations on investors can lead to 
unbalanced outcomes that undermine the legitimacy of the system.90 
For example, balancing the rights and responsibilities under treaties 
by increasing the availability of counterclaims by States under BITs 
may help redress this concern. 
Second, cases involving environmental disputes often involve 
complicated technical issues.91 Without direction from the treaty, 
tribunals have focused on either the merits of the scientific evidence 
or the scientific process that regulators follow.92 Tribunals that opt 
for the former approach face the daunting task of assessing the 
reliability of conflicting scientific evidence presented by each party. 
To aid in analyzing this complex technical evidence, disputing 
parties and arbitrators may avail themselves of currently under-
utilized procedural and evidentiary means. First, international 
environmental courts and specialized arbitral rules offer a promising 
alternative to ensure that the process is sensitive to the issues raised 
in these disputes.93 Second, increased participation of non-disputing 
parties could contribute to the tribunal’s understanding of the wider 
interests at stake and assuage criticisms regarding the democratic 
BIT, supra note 30, Annex B.13(1)(c) (providing an identical policy space 
provision to the U.S. BIT and CAFTA but further defining the rare circumstances 
as situations where “a measure or series of measures are so severe in the light of 
their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and 
applied in good faith”). 
 90.  See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Role of Counterclaims in Rebalancing 
Investment Law, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 461, 462-63 (2013) (using the 
example of a State’s inability to file a claim under most investment treaties to 
demonstrate the imbalance of power between investors and States). 
 91.  See, e.g., Gail Bingham, Pamela Esterman & Christopher Riti, Effective 
Representation of Clients in Environmental Dispute Resolution, 27 PACE ENVT’L. 
L. REV. 61, 63 (2009) (“Environmental disputes also tend to involve complex 
technical issues and scientific uncertainty. There are typically gaps in scientific 
information, different models or assumptions for interpreting existing data, and 
multiple disciplines each with their own terminology, and all of which complicate 
the dispute.”). 
 92.  Compare Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on 
Jurisdiction and Merits, Part III Ch. A ¶¶ 101, 102(2)-(4) (UNCITRAL 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf (considering whether the 
study predicating the MTBE ban was conducted in good faith rather than whether 
it was methodologically sound or empirically correct), with Chemtura Corp., 
Award ¶ 153 (forgoing consideration of scientific evidence in favor of deferring to 
State and international practice regarding the regulation of lindane). 
 93.  See discussion infra Section IV.B.1. 
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deficit in investment arbitration.94 Finally, the precautionary 
principle may provide a useful device to assess and weigh scientific 
evidence associated with high levels of uncertainty and risk.95 
Moreover, tribunals may have recourse to certain conceptual tools, 
in the form of administrative standards of review and defenses,96 in 
cases where the focus turns to the scientific process followed by 
regulators. Such analyses could provide a means to balance the 
regulatory powers of States against the commercial interests of 
foreign investors. Utilizing the concept of police powers, applying 
the margin of appreciation to government conduct, and assessing the 
proportionality of state action vis-à-vis the harm done are legal tools 
most adept to assessing procedures followed by States.97 
A. REVISING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
The rise of BITs and investment arbitration cases has increased the 
exposure of States to challenges for regulatory conduct taken for 
environmental or health reasons.98 This growth of investor-state 
arbitrations with an environmental dimension should cause States to 
take a serious look at their investment treaties to ensure that the 
sustainable development goals of policymakers are adequately 
reflected and placed on an equal plane with economic growth. To 
achieve this, States can modify their BIT Models and future treaties 
to include more robust exception clauses and counterclaim 
provisions. Despite their friction at times, these policy goals do not  
 94.  See discussion infra Section IV.B.3. 
 95.  See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.; see also Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5, 31 
I.L.M. 8744 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (“In order to protect the 
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”). 
 96.  See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 36. 
 97.  Infra Section IV.C. 
 98.  Presently, there are approximately 3,200 agreements in existence. 
According to one recent survey, at least ninety-five countries have had to respond 
to one or more of the 500 plus treaty-based disputes. Towards a New Generation of 
International Investment Policies: UNCTAD’s Fresh Approach to Multilateral 
Investment Policy-Making, UNCTAD 4-5 (July 2013), http://unctad.org/en/ 
PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d6_en.pdf [hereinafter Towards a New 
Generation of International Investment Policies]. 
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have to conflict because sustainable development can complement 
economic growth objectives through responsible investment. 
1. Robust Exception Clauses 
States have begun to ensure that environmental policy goals are 
reflected in bilateral investment treaties and regional agreements in 
various ways. While preamble clauses recognizing environmental 
protection objectives and provisions discouraging regulatory 
slackness tend to be dull tools,99 a clearly drafted exception clause 
may offer better protection against challenges to legitimate 
environmental measures. An exception clause allows States to 
reserve wider policy space to respond to new circumstances with 
greater regulatory flexibility.100 
Exception clauses can designate subjects, such as endangered 
species, biodiversity, toxic chemicals, and air pollution, that are 
immune from investment claims. However, in a rapidly changing 
world, it is unlikely that all future environmental challenges can be 
anticipated in advance. Moreover, failing to anticipate an area of 
environmental concern might have the unintended consequence of 
limiting the range of legitimate objectives available to the State.101 A 
more practical solution might be to exclude measures adopted for 
environmental reasons from certain investment disciplines, such as 
indirect expropriation.102 Carving out treaty obligations instead of 
broadly excluding environmental disputes from dispute settlement 
provisions should also ensure that the rights of foreign investors are 
adequately protected. 
Including exception clauses offers potential advantages. First, it 
provides States with greater policy space to address environmental 
problems without breaching certain international investment 
 99.  See supra Section II. 
 100.  See Robert Volterra, Memorandum for the Workshop on Global Investment 
Governance, BLAVATNIK SCH. OF GOV’T 30 (June 28, 2012), http://www.bsg.ox. 
ac.uk/events/multilateral-liberalisation-through-bilateral-treaties (noting that States 
may be restrained by BITs that do not include exception clauses, which often 
reserve more power to States to use regulatory measures in case of a crisis). 
 101.  See Newcombe, supra note 32, at 358 (stating that some arbitral tribunals 
may interpret general exception provisions as limiting, rather than empowering, 
state regulatory power). 
 102.  See supra note 39. 
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obligations. Second, exception clauses can be implemented with 
relative ease when the political will exists between the States. Third, 
a facially legitimate and non-discriminatory regulation combined 
with a robust exceptions clause should avoid the need for tribunals to 
scrutinize the entire realm of government motives. To accomplish 
these objectives, it is imperative to ensure that tribunals give full 
effect to these provisions. 
2. Counterclaims Provisions 
Investor-state arbitration is often viewed as a one-way street, and 
States rarely file counterclaims against investors.103 The current 
language and orientation of investment treaties may be one reason 
for this. The challenge for States bringing counterclaims in disputes 
arising under a treaty is identifying the investor’s specific obligations 
and thus the tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the dispute.104 Indeed, the 
signatories—and thus the parties bound—to the investment treaty are 
only the host state and the national state, and not the investor. 
Another hurdle in environmental cases is that tribunals may be 
reluctant to interpret BITs in ways that impose liability for the 
externalities associated with investment activity, such as breaches of 
human rights or harm to the environment. 
  
 103.  José Antonio Rivas, ICSID Treaty Counterclaims: Case Law and Treaty 
Evolution, 11 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. no. 1, 2014, at 2, available at 
http://www.transnational-disputemanagement.com/search/get_page.asp?v2=down 
load&v1=tv11%2D1%2Darticle68%2E.pdf (positing that investors have initiated 
nearly all ICSID cases brought pursuant to a treaty, as opposed to a contract); see 
also Alschner & Tuerk, supra note 47, at 226 (“IIAs do little to ensure that [S]tates 
get the development contribution they seek from foreign investment in return for 
tying their hands in an international agreement.”); Yaraslau Kryvoi, Counterclaims 
in Investor-State Arbitration 9-10 (Lon. Sch. Econ. & Political Sci., LSE Law, 
Soc’y & Econ. Working Paper No. 8/2011, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1891935 (stating that the “vast majority” of BITs are silent on the issue of 
counterclaims). 
 104.  See, e.g., Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 869 
(Dec. 7, 2011), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2431_En&caseId=C70 2011) (finding 
the language of the BIT to “undoubtedly limit jurisdiction to claims brought by 
investors”); Genin v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 
216, 222, 287, 385(1) (June 25, 2001), 17 ICSID Rev. FILJ 395 (2002) 
(considering and rejecting Estonia’s counterclaim founded on proceeds illicitly 
transferred out of an Estonian financial institution). 
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However, when consent is clear, tribunals might not balk in 
accepting jurisdiction. As the Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of 
Uzbekistan tribunal recently put it when adjudicating a counterclaim 
in an investment case: 
In treaty arbitration, consent is achieved by the respondent State making 
an offer to arbitrate when ratifying the investment treaty and the investor 
accepting that offer in principle when filing the request for arbitration. 
The scope of the offer is defined in the State’s investment treaty, in 
particular in the dispute resolution clause of that treaty. When he initiates 
arbitration under the treaty, the investor accepts the offer within the scope 
defined in the treaty.105 
In this case, although the tribunal determined that the language of 
the BIT covered “any dispute about an investment,” it declined to 
find jurisdiction over either the main claim or the counterclaim 
because it found the Claimant’s actions did not constitute an 
investment within the meaning of the BIT.106 Beyond disputes arising 
out of treaty claims in which consent is not always clear, however, 
disputes arising from contractual claims may encounter more success 
with counterclaims due to the breach of a legal instrument under 
which both parties carry obligations.107 
Investment treaties could be re-drafted to provide for express 
consent for the counterclaim. For example, express language that 
makes clear that the term “disputes” signifies both claims and 
counterclaims or language indicating consent to the submission of 
“any disputes” or “all disputes” would signal to the tribunal that 
parties have granted consent.108 Some States have begun to impose 
 105.  Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, 
Award, ¶ 409 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com. 
 106.  Id. ¶¶ 410-11. 
 107.  See, e.g., Atlantic Triton v. Government of Guinea, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/1, Award, (Apr. 21, 1986), 3 ICSID Rev. 23 (1995) (finding jurisdiction 
on the basis of a signed contract between the parties but rejecting the counterclaim 
on the merits); Maritime Int’l Nominees Establishment v. Government of Guinea, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision, ¶ 8.01 (Dec. 14, 1989), 5 ICSID Rev. 95 
(1990) (discussing award in which tribunal exercised jurisdiction over Guinea’s 
counterclaim and upheld it for the claimant’s violation of the dispute resolution 
clause, which required ICSID to handle disputes). 
 108.  Rivas, supra note 103, at 5 (citing Inmaris v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/8, Award, ¶¶ 270, 432, (Mar. 1, 2012), Paushak v. Government of 
Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 689 (UNCITRAL 2011), and 
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direct obligations on investors in their model treaties.109 However, in 
practice, it may be difficult to negotiate these provisions with some 
developing states that wish to be seen as “investor-friendly”110 or, 
conversely, with capital-exporting states that wish to protect their 
nationals. Because States do not know whether including 
counterclaims in BITs would dry up foreign investment, States may 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the unidentified 
costs of including counterclaim provisions outweigh the buy-in that 
governments could potentially receive from their constituents.111 
In the event that redrafting the dispute resolution clause is not an 
option, States could opt for inserting preambular language that 
promotes environmentally responsible investment in tandem with 
foreign direct investment objectives, either explicitly or by reference 
to other international corporate social responsibility or environmental 
standards, such as the Voluntary Principles, U.N. Global Compact, 
and Rio Declaration.112 States could also include screening 
Saluka Invests. BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 39 (UNCITRAL 2004)). 
 109.  See, e.g., Alschner & Tuerk, supra note 47, at 228 (citing to Ghana’s and 
Botswana’s Model BITs); see also HOWARD MANN ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT 
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: NEGOTIATORS’ HANDBOOK 9, 15, 22, 29 (2d ed. 
2006), available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-
model-bit-template-final.pdf (including multiple provisions that impose obligations 
on investors, such as disclosure and contribution requirements); SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN DEV. CMTY., SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY TEMPLATE 
WITH COMMENTARY 5, 32, 39 (2012), available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf (including a model 
 provision that imposes common obligations on both investors and States regarding 
corruption and another which would ensure tribunals have jurisdiction over 
breaches of such obligations). 
 110.  It is of course open to debate whether BITs lead to more foreign direct 
investment.  See Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 
337, 349 (2006) (pointing out that many international bodies, such as the 
UNCTAD and World Bank, have found investment treaties have “minimal impact 
on foreign investments,” although such treaties still play a large role in promoting 
foreign investment relative to other driving forces). 
 111.  Another option might be to require the investor to consent to the 
submission of an ICSID counterclaim when requesting arbitration against the 
State.  In practice, this would likely only occur upon the State’s insistence at the 
time it is notified of the dispute.  See Rivas, supra note 103, at 5 (expressing doubt 
that investors would willfully expose themselves to cross-claim liability). 
 112.  See, e.g., Alschner & Tuerk, supra note 47, at 227 (discussing the 
increasing rate at which free trade agreements cite to customary international 
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provisions in their domestic laws113 that allow the government to vet 
potential investors before they can invest in environmentally 
sensitive sectors.114 However, this may not be a viable option for 
States that lack the capacity to engage in this vetting process or are 
large recipients of foreign direct investment. Finally, another option 
might be to expand denial of benefits clauses115 to prevent parties 
from enjoying the treaty’s benefits if there is environmental harm 
caused to the host state. Ultimately, any desired changes to a treaty’s 
language or structure could be included in a State’s Model BIT. 
With respect to existing treaties, there are a few options are 
available. Contracting states could amend existing BITs. When 
adopting this approach, States must be mindful of how existing 
treaties will retrospectively impact previous investments and 
potentially circumvent development-friendly provisions by using 
broad most favored nation clauses. Alternatively, a State could 
terminate the BIT. However, termination may not be politically 
feasible. Further, many BITs provide that a State’s obligations 
survive the treaty for a prescribed period of time in relation to 
norms, such as U.N. Global Compact). See generally Rio Declaration, supra note 
95, princ. 15 (mandating that States do not forego implementing environmental 
protections simply because no scientific consensus exists); United Nations Global 
Compact: Corporate Sustainability in the World Economy, U.N. GLOBAL 
COMPACT OFFICE (Jan. 2014), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/newsevents/ 
8.1/GC_brochure_FINAL.pdf (stating that businesses should adopt the 
Precautionary Principle and promote sustainability policies); Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 20, 2000), 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/001220_fsdrl_principles.html. 
 113.  Smitha Francis, Rethinking Investment Provisions in Free Trade 
Agreements 1, 8 (Int’l Dev. Econ. Assoc., Policy Note, 2012), available at 
http://www.networkideas.org/alt/may2011/Investment_Policy_Note.pdf 
(suggesting that domestic procedures for vetting investors could be imported into 
the treaty through language such as “in accordance with the domestic laws of the 
host state”). 
 114.  See, e.g., MANN ET AL., supra note 109, at 22-23 (formulating a model 
treaty provision requiring investors to conduct a pre-impact study before beginning 
the relevant business in a contracting state); see also Alschner & Tuerk, supra note 
47, at 228 (stating that screening provisions allow host states to collect valuable 
information on investors so they can make informed decisions on whether to 
accept investments). 
 115.  See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1113 (outlining the criteria by which 
a state party could refuse the coverage of NAFTA when dealing with an investor 
owned or controlled by a non-party state). 
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investments made before the effective date of termination.116 Perhaps 
a third approach is to use regional trade agreements, which can offer 
a consistent level of protection across States.117 However, this would 
require phasing out old agreements to avoid overlap and 
inconsistencies. In short, revising a treaty—whether to include more 
robust exception clauses, counterclaim provisions, or any other 
development-friendly text—is a progressive move toward ensuring 
that States consider environmental issues in investment arbitration, 
but the process will likely be gradual at best. 
B. PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY MEANS TO EVALUATE 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
Some environmental disputes raise complicated technical issues. 
Arbitrators may be asked to evaluate and reconcile conflicting 
scientific evidence. As we have seen, investment treaty jurisprudence 
reflects two broad approaches in dealing with scientific matters. 
Some awards suggest that tribunals prefer deferring to the State’s 
scientific findings and their analysis focuses on the scientific process 
that regulators follow. In other cases, tribunals have opted to evaluate 
the soundness of the scientific findings. This section proposes 
potential mechanisms for assessing scientific evidence based on the 
choice of forum or arbitral rules, the use of third party procedures, 
and the application of evidentiary principles. The following section 
considers what conceptual tools tribunals can apply to their 
evaluation of the scientific process. 
 
1. An International Environmental Court or Environmental Arbitral 
Rules 
Creating an international environmental court is an idea that has 
been floated in the international community for some time. In 1993, 
 116.  See Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in OXFORD GUIDE TO 
TREATIES 634, 640 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1937205 (stating that it is a common tenet of 
international law that treaty obligations can still persist even when the treaty 
expires or a party terminates it). 
 117.  See Towards a New Generation of International Investment Policies, supra 
note 98, at 5 (noting a gradual shift towards regionalism which can promote 
consistent investment rules). 
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the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) took heed and established a 
Chamber for Environmental Matters to hear environmental disputes 
between States. Acting pursuant to article 26(1) of the Statute of the 
Court, the ICJ explained that the Chamber was created “[i]n view of 
the developments in the field of environmental law and protection 
which have taken place in the last few years” and taking into account 
the need to “be prepared to the fullest possible extent to deal with 
any environmental case falling within its jurisdiction.”118 Curiously, 
this Chamber has yet to be used and, in fact, the Court has suspended 
elections for a bench since 2006.119 Some commentators posit that 
the Chamber fell into disuse because States have not chosen to define 
their dispute as purely environmental.120 In the foreign investment 
sphere, an international environmental court is not likely to be a 
viable option for the following reasons. Procedurally, this model may 
not be directly transposable to investment arbitration where disputes 
are heard before ad hoc tribunals according to institutional rules 
specified under the treaty.121 From a practical perspective, it is 
difficult to imagine a standing body of arbitrators with the 
specialized knowledge or expertise to make determinations on 
scientific or technical matters. 
 
Instead, arbitration rules designed for environmental disputes may 
offer a better solution. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) 
has made great strides in this direction. In 2001, the PCA developed 
the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the 
 118.  Press Communiqué 93/20, Int’l Court of Justice, Constitution of a 
Chamber of the Court for Environmental Matters (July 19, 1993), http://www.ruhr-
uni-bochum.de/www-public/fischhcy/ICJ/E269.htm. 
 119.  See The Court: Chambers and Committees, INT’L COURT JUSTICE, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=4 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) 
(stating that the elections were suspended because States had not yet requested that 
the Chamber hear a case). 
 120.  See, e.g., Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, 
Tribunals and the Progressive Development of International Environmental Law, 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 4 (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.oecd.org/ 
investment/globalforum/40311090.pdf. 
 121.  See generally Ole W. Pedersen, An International Environmental Court and 
International Legalism, 24 J. ENVTL. L. 547, 551 (2012) (arguing that the 
International Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation may provide an 
alternative model for disputes involving non-state actors if the court moves beyond 
the issuance of consultative opinions). 
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Environment and/or Natural Resources. These Optional Rules are 
based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules but have been modified for 
disputes relating to natural resources, conservation, or environmental 
protection.122 Parties may agree to apply these rules in agreements, 
contracts, treaties, or upon mutual consent.123 The Optional Rules 
contain several unique features related to: (i) appointing competent 
arbitrators; (ii) selecting qualified experts; and (iii) assisting the 
tribunal with evaluating scientific or technical matters.124 For 
example, the PCA provides parties with a list of arbitrators 
considered to have expertise in the subject-matter of the dispute.125 
The Optional Rules also assist in the arbitrator’s understanding of 
technical and scientific matters by allowing tribunals to request a 
non-technical document summarizing any scientific or technical 
information.126 The Optional Rules go beyond other arbitral rules that 
empower tribunals to appoint their own experts by providing support 
from the Secretary-General in identifying experts.127 
 122.  Report, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION ¶ 17, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=503 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
 123.  See Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural 
Resources and/or the Environment, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION 185 
(June 19, 2001), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=590 [hereinafter 
Perm. Ct. Arb. Optional Rules for Arbitration]. 
 124.  Id. at 187-88, 197-99; see also Natalie L. Bridgeman & David B. Hunter, 
Narrowing the Accountability Gap: Toward A New Foreign Investor 
Accountability Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 216 (2008) 
(arguing the PCA optional rules are potentially well-suited for resolving 
environmental disputes while acknowledging that the PCA has some shortcomings 
as a forum, which have led to the optional rules not being used). 
 125.  See Perm. Ct. Arb. Optional Rules for Arbitration, supra note 123, at 190 
(requiring the PCA’s Secretary-General to make a list “of persons considered to 
have expertise in the subject-matters of the dispute at hand” and to provide it to the 
parties). 
 126.  Id. at 197. 
 127.  Compare id. at 198-99 (mandating that the PCA Secretary-General be 
involved in calling further expert witnesses), with Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 29(1), U.N. 
GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976) (stating that 
a tribunal may close proceedings when the parties have no further offers of proof, 
without providing any independent authority to call witnesses), and Int’l Bar 
Ass’n, IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration art. 6(1) 
(May 29, 2010) (allowing individual tribunals to call further expert witnesses, but 
requiring the tribunal to work with the parties to determine which expert witnesses 
to call). 
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The PCA’s Optional Rules offer a novel approach to manage 
technical and scientific issues involved in some environmental 
disputes. While using experts should assist with the tribunal’s 
understanding of these issues, it will also inevitably increase 
arbitration costs. The parties may take steps to control these expenses 
by deferring the use of experts until a later stage in the proceedings. 
For example, where jurisdictional objections have been raised (that 
do not involve the evaluation of technical or scientific evidence), the 
parties may refrain from using experts until the merits or damages 
phase. In addition, the tribunal’s understanding of technical matters 
may be clarified at a manageable cost by using joint experts, 
although this may be difficult to implement in practice. Exposing 
experts’ evidence to external scrutiny by making pleadings publicly 
available or live broadcasting oral proceedings may be another cost 
effective strategy to test expert evidence. This has the added benefit 
of increasing transparency in cases that often implicate public policy 
issues. However, increasing transparency of written and oral 
submissions is meaningless if it is not complemented with non-
disputing party participation, a topic explored below. 
2. Third-party Participation 
Although initially disfavored, third-party participation has taken 
off in investor-state arbitration in recent years, most notably in the 
form of amicus curiae written submissions.128 The structural shift in 
the various sets of arbitration rules may allow for more meaningful 
third-party participation in investor-state disputes.129 
 128.  Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: 
The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation, 29 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 200, 201 (2011) (discussing other forms of third-party participation 
including publishing documents, granting access to hearing, and presenting and/or 
testifying at hearings). 
 129.  In general, tribunals are increasingly engaged in third-party participation 
despite the fact that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules neither authorize nor 
expressly prohibit third-party participation. See G.A. Res. 31/98, supra note 127, 
arts. 4-5 (allowing parties to enlist the help of third-parties, while requiring parties 
to give notice to other litigants as to the nature of the third-party’s assistance). 
However, the Commission adopted a set of rules in April 2014 that aim to improve 
transparency in investor-state arbitration. These new rules shift the underlying 
assumption of privacy in these disputes to one of transparency. Articles 4 and 5 of 
the Rules govern participation by third-parties and non-disputing states and affirm 
the authority of investment tribunals to accept submissions from them. U.N. 
 
  
2015] GOING GREEN 415 
Third-party participation provides an opportunity to bring 
scientific or technical points, other facts, or laws to the attention of 
the tribunal. Historically, the special perspective or expertise 
provided to the court or tribunal justified amicus participation.130 For 
example, in Methanex, the U.S. government argued its case on public 
health grounds while the amici raised environmental law issues not 
otherwise addressed.131 While interested third parties could always 
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN 
TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 8-9 (2013), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-
on-Transparency-E.pdf. In July 2014, UNCITRAL approved the Mauritius 
Convention on Transparency that increases the applicability of these transparency 
rules, as they currently only apply to cases brought under treaties that were 
concluded after April 1, 2014, unless parties consent to their application to earlier 
treaties. Press Release, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Commission on 
International Trade Law Approves Draft UNCITRAL Convention on Transparency 
in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, U.N. Press Release UNIS/L/202 (July 
10, 2014), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2014/unis 
l202.html. Most recently, in March 2015, eight States signed the Mauritius 
Convention, which provides that investor-state disputes to which they are party 
will be subject to the new transparency rules. U.N. Press Release UNIS/L/214, 
Signing Ceremony for the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-
based Investor-State Arbitration (March 17, 2015), available at http://www.unis.un 
vienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2015/unisl214.html. In addition, in 2006, the ICSID 
Rules of Arbitration were amended to explicitly recognize the tribunal’s authority 
to allow third-party participation through written submissions. See ICSID 
Convention, Regulations and Rules, INT’L CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. 
DISPUTES 101 (Apr. 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/ 
CRREnglish-final.pdf (granting authority to allow third-party participation after 
certain considerations, such as whether the third-party would help reach a 
determination of fact or law, whether the third-party would address an issue within 
the scope of the dispute, and whether the third-party had an interest in the dispute). 
Also, several States, including Canada, the United States, and Norway, now 
incorporate reference to the rights of third-parties in their model BITs. See, e.g., 
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty¸ supra note 22, art. 28(3) (providing that 
tribunals shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae 
submissions). 
 130.  Lance Bartholomeusz, The Amicus Curiae Before International Courts 
and Tribunals, 5 NON-ST. ACTORS & INT’L L. 209, 211 (2005). 
 131.  See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Submission of Non-Disputing 
Parties Bluewater Network, Communities for a Better Environment and Center for 
International Environmental Law, at 2, 5 (UNCITRAL 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/30472.pdf  (arguing for deferential 
review of California’s evidence and the particular dangers of MTBE to potable 
water); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Application for Amicus Curiae Status by 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development, at 2-3 (UNCITRAL 2004), 
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petition the parties to the dispute with their expertise or knowledge, 
allowing an independent party to provide expertise in a separate 
process is valuable because it prevents disputing parties from acting 
as gatekeepers of specialized knowledge. 
This is certainly true in cases that implicate environmental issues. 
Environmental policy usually provides the tools to evaluate 
problems, such as environmental impact studies, risk assessments 
(such as Environmental Risk Assessments), policy design, and cost-
benefit analysis.132 Arbitral tribunals may not be best-placed to 
scrutinize these assessments whereas expert non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) can provide robust and independent expert 
analysis.133 This expertise can also help in situations where the 
tribunal faces the difficult task of assessing the validity of conflicting 
scientific evidence from each party.134 Such participation may 
provide the tribunal with information it needs to make a decision. 
 
Some argue that the practical burdens of arbitration increase with 
more third-party participation and lead to more cost and delay for the 
parties.135 While a State may often be more willing to bear this 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/30473.pdf (discussing the host 
state’s right to protect the environment and promote sustainable development in 
the international law context); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Amended 
Statement of Defense of Respondent, ¶ 15 (UNCITRAL 2003), 
 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27063.pdf  (conceptualizing the  
California ban on MTBE as a measure to protect public health given the effects of 
the chemical once it enters the water system); see also PMI v. Uruguay, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/7, Procedural Order No. 3 (Feb. 17, 2015), www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4161.pdf (granting petition by the WHO 
and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Secretariat to file a 
submission providing evidence of the relationship between health warning labels 
and the protection of public health). 
 132.  Tomoko Ishikawa, Third Party Participation in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 377, 403 (2010); see generally Valentina S. 
Vadi, Environmental Impact Assessments in Investment Disputes: Method, 
Governance and Jurisprudence, 30 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 169 (2010) (describing 
Environmental Impact Analysis as a means of avoiding dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the first place). 
 133.  See Ishikawa, supra note 132, at 403 (claiming that NGOs are “best 
placed” to determine what approach to environmental issues are optimal). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See Lucas Bastin, The Amicus Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration, 1 
CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 208, 225 (2012) (arguing that allowing amicus 
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burden given the aid that third-parties can provide to its case, third-
parties can benefit investors as well.136 These burdens can be 
minimized, however, by defining the procedures for amicus 
participation, such as specifying the number and length of 
submissions, stipulating the qualifications of participants, and 
limiting participation to particular facts or issues. Whereas experts 
add to the costs each side must bear, third-parties provide 
information at little, if any, cost to the parties. In addition, these 
concerns have not borne out in practice; for example, third-party 
participation has not led to an unwieldy number of submissions in 
the WTO or before other international tribunals.137 
Tribunals that receive evidentiary assistance through third-party 
participation may have the added benefit of increasing the decision’s 
legitimacy.138 This is particularly true as arbitrations are increasingly 
addressing sectors that utilize natural resources, such as water, 
minerals, oil, and gas, and thus implicate public interest issues. This 
has led some observers to question whether the investment 
arbitration system should permit private ad-hoc tribunals composed 
of foreign nationals to render judgments on democratically-enacted 
legislation.139 Thus, the perception that this process may potentially 
submissions greatly increase the litigation costs of parties opposing the opinions 
expressed in those submissions). 
 136.  See, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Non-Disputing Party 
Submission of the National Mining Association, at 8, 10 (UNCITRAL 2006), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75179.pdf (submitting a brief 
arguing that States should not abruptly change regulation regimes, as the financial 
stability of the mining industry depended on a predictable legal paradigm). 
 137.  See Kyla Tienhaara, Third-Party Participation in Investment-Environment 
Disputes: Recent Developments, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 
230, 240 (2007) (stating that it has not been the experience of the WTO that 
allowing third party participation has “open[ed] the floodgates”). 
 138.  Id. at 234-35 (quoting Suez, Sociedad General de Barcelona S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition 
for Participation as Amicus Curie, ¶¶ 21-22 (Mar. 17, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. FILJ 
351 (2006)); see Andrew Newcombe & Axelle Lemaire, Should Amici Curiae 
Participate in Investment Treaty Arbitrations?, 5 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & 
ARB. 22, 31-32 (2001) (arguing that arbitration proceedings lack legitimacy if they 
do not provide for some measure of public participation). 
 139.  See Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment 
Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic 
Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 783 (2008) (positing that international 
arbitration mechanisms may potentially threaten “basic principles of democracy,” 
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usurp national decision-making and erode aspects of state 
sovereignty can be counterbalanced with public sector or NGO 
participation.140 Such participation can promote procedural openness 
by allowing public interest groups to provide particular knowledge or 
insight on public policy issues. Third party participation can also 
ensure that the public does not perceive the process as taking place 
behind closed doors141 or too costly or burdensome to be justified. 
Beyond third-party participation, tribunals may deal with 
complicated scientific evidence by shifting the evidentiary burden, as 
is discussed below. 
3. The Precautionary Principle 
The general rule in international arbitration is that each party has 
the burden of proving facts in support of its claim (“actori incumbit 
probatio”).142 Any deviation from this rule is rare. However, a 
as these mechanisms are increasingly used to undermine domestic regulations 
created by elected officials); Newcombe & Lemaire, supra note 138, at 29-30 
(arguing that the use of amicus curie briefs counterbalance the perceived problem 
of investors using international arbitration to bypass the democratic mechanisms 
by which domestic regulations are passed); see also George Kahale, III, A Problem 
in Investor/State Arbitration, 6 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT., no. 1, 2009, at 2-3 
(discussing States’ increasing dissatisfaction with the investor-state system due to 
the perception of sovereign prerogatives giving way to private interests); Public 
Statement, Osgoode Hall L. Sch., Public Statement on the International Investment 
Regime – 31 (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-
statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/ (advocating for States 
to withdraw or renegotiate investment treaties to ensure they are able to effectively 
advocate for their respective populations). 
 140.  See Levine, supra note 128, at 205, 209 (noting that many investor-state 
disputes involve public service sectors and that NGOs involved in related 
arbitration dispute usually advocate on behalf of the public interest in these 
sectors). 
 141.  See Op-Ed, The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/27/opinion/27mon3.html?_r=1& (arguing that, 
due to the great impact arbitration decisions can have on public welfare, there is an 
implicit obligation that arbitrations take place in a public forum). 
 142.  U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 
(AS REVISED IN 2010) art. 27 (2011), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/ 
english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf; see also 
MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON 
EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 53 (1996) (stating the 
“fundamental obligation of parties to prove their allegations”); SHABTAI ROSANNE, 
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-2005 1040 (2006) 
(noting the application of this principle requires “the party putting forward a claim 
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tribunal may adjust the burden of proof where it is difficult to 
establish the environmental risk or harm of a particular activity. A 
shift in the burden of proof could be achieved according to one 
interpretation of the precautionary principle.143 
While no uniform definition of the precautionary principle 
exists,144 it is generally understood to govern how States should 
respond in situations of scientific uncertainty where there are risks of 
serious or irreversible damage. Scientific uncertainty may be the 
result of insufficient data, the indeterminacy of the degree of harm, 
or an absence of knowledge regarding risks involved. The principle 
functions to shift risk from society to those seeking to engage in 
or a particular contention to establish the elements of fact and of law on which the 
decision in its favour might be given.”); DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE 
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 92-93 (1939) (describing the basic rule of 
burden of proof as resting on the party that asserts the affirmative of the 
proposition). 
 143.  The conceptual origin of the precautionary principle is generally traced to 
the German environmental policy “Vorsorgeprinzipo” (meaning “worrying 
before”). In recent years, it has emerged as a principle of international 
environmental law. It first achieved global recognition at the 1992 Earth Summit 
where the concept was reflected in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development. See Rio Declaration, supra note 95, princ. 15 
(rejecting the requirement for absolute scientific certainty where environmental 
damage may be irreversible). The principle has since been enshrined in 
international environmental treaties relating to climate change, oceans and 
watercourses, marine pollution, fisheries conservation, ozone layer protection, 
conservation of endangered species, biological diversity, and trade in hazardous 
waste. See, e.g., 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter arts. 2, 3, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 
I.L.M. 1 (1997) (maritime pollution context); Agreement for the Implementation of 
the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 6, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3 
(1995) (fisheries context); Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic art. 2(2)(a), Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1228 
(1993) (maritime pollution context); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, pmbl, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (1987) 
(airborne pollution context). 
 144.  PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 272-73 (3d ed. 2012); Daniel Kazhdan, Precautionary Pulp: Pulp Mills and 
the Evolving Dispute Between International Tribunals over the Reach of the 
Precautionary Principle, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 527, 529-30 (2011); see also David 
VanderZwaag, The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy: 
Elusive Rhetoric and First Embraces, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 355, 360 (1998) 
(finding several interpretations of the concept). 
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risky activities such that the latter bears the burden of proving the 
safety of the proposed activities. It is based on the assumption that, in 
the face of a serious risk, States should act now rather than wait to 
see whether the harm occurs. In this way, the principle could be 
viewed as a defensive strategy for a State that seeks to preclude 
activities for which the harm is uncertain. 
This approach is not without controversy.145 There are mixed 
views on when and how to use the principle, such as what level of 
uncertainty is needed to invoke the principle. As a result of this lack 
of precision, some non-state actors have argued that the 
precautionary principle can be a form of protectionism. However, the 
precautionary principle does not excuse a treaty breach. Rather, this 
approach merely increases the evidentiary burden on the party 
seeking to engage in harmful activity by allowing tribunals to assess 
and weigh highly technical but uncertain scientific evidence on 
environmental harms. While no investment treaty tribunal has 
expressly applied the precautionary principle, other international 
courts and tribunals have considered it,146 suggesting that there may 
be room for its application in the investor-state context.147 The 
application of the principle is highly fact-specific; nevertheless, it 
could be applied in exceptional cases involving a high level of 
scientific uncertainty and risk of environmental damage, such as 
nuclear power.148 
  
 145.  See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Andrew Newcombe, An Integrated 
Agenda for Sustainable Development in International Investment Law, in 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 120-21 (Marie-Claire 
Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011). 
 146.  See, e.g., Simon Marr, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: The 
Precautionary Approach and Conservation and Management of Fish Resources, 
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 816 (2000) (arguing that the court in the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna case implicitly applied the precautionary principle). 
 147.  See Norway Model BIT, supra note 30, art. 24(v) (referring to the right of 
the contracting parties to adopt or enforce measures deemed necessary, including 
under the precautionary principle, to protect the environment). 
 148.  See CAROLINE E. FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: EXPERT EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF 
PROOF AND FINALITY 18 (2011) (arguing that the high threshold requirement of an 
“exceptional case” involves “the need for decision-making that errs on the side of 
allowing for worst-case scenarios”). 
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C. CONCEPTUAL TOOLS TO BALANCE THE REGULATORY POWERS 
OF STATES WITH THE INTERESTS OF FOREIGN INVESTORS 
While arbitral rules for managing expert evidence, third-party 
participation, and evidentiary burden-shifting can help tribunals 
better assess scientific evidence, varying standards of review and 
recognition of specific defenses allow tribunals to properly evaluate 
the regulatory process. Regulation is essential to state functions and 
many argue this authority must be protected if the State is to act in 
the public interest on environmental, health, economic, and social 
issues.149 Because of concerns regarding mounting indirect 
expropriation claims that threaten this “right to regulate,” some 
States have changed their approach to include more robust carve-outs 
or exclusions in investment agreements. Indeed, the conceptual tools 
described below can also be used as interpretive guidance for these 
exceptions or carve-out clauses in treaties. 
Even in the absence of such clauses, States have argued that 
tribunals should defer to State regulators’ scientific findings made on 
a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary basis and in accordance with 
due process. Various standards of review and defenses suggest that 
investment tribunals may not be best-positioned to make value 
judgments on internal environmental policies, which may involve 
technical expertise.150 For example, as discussed above, in Chemtura 
Corp., the tribunal noted that it was not within the scope of its task to 
“second-guess the correctness of the science-based decision-making 
of highly specialized national regulatory agencies.”151 
 149.  Rainer Geiger, Regulatory Expropriations in International Law: Lessons 
from the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 94, 108 
(2002); see also Stephen Olynyk, A Balanced Approach to Distinguishing Between 
Legitimate Regulation and Indirect Expropriation in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 
INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 254, 279 (2012) (citing M. SORNARAJAH, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 283 (2004)) (arguing that non-
discriminatory policy space provisions typically relate to areas of regulation 
critical to state administration). 
 150.  See, e.g.,  S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award on Liability, ¶ 261 
(UNCITRAL Nov. 13, 2000) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (holding that Chapter 11 
tribunals do “not have open-ended” mandates to review the policy decisions of 
States). 
 151.  Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶ 134 (UNCITRAL Aug. 2, 2010) 
(Kluwer Law Int’l); see also Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican 
States, Award, ¶ 160 (UNCITRAL Jan. 26, 2006) (Kluwer Law Int’l). 
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Balancing a State’s regulatory powers against the interests of 
foreign investors is particularly apt in environmental cases. The 
“chilling effect” on the host state’s environmental policy is powerful 
as States already face immense pressure from domestic and 
international businesses to relax their environmental standards. For 
example, in Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, one of the first NAFTA cases 
that involved the banning of a gasoline additive that the government 
found to be toxic, Canada settled and reversed the ban in the face of 
a $251 million claim and a loss on a jurisdictional ruling.152 More 
than ten years later, Canada settled another environmental case, this 
time involving a challenge by the agrochemical company, Dow 
AgroSciences, over a Quebec ban on the sale and use of lawn 
pesticides containing the ingredient 2, 4-D.153 Acknowledging the 
complexity of these concepts and the uncertainty with which 
tribunals may or may not utilize them, the following subsections 
introduce potential legal tools available to tribunals when 
adjudicating the right to regulate. 
1. Police Powers 
Customary international law establishes that certain state action is 
beyond compensation under the international law of expropriation 
because States enjoy wide latitude to regulate within the realm of 
their police powers.154 Police powers cover State actions such as 
taxation, legislation restricting the use of property—including in 
areas of planning, environment, safety, and health—and the 
imposition of criminal penalties.155 In the modern legal view of 
police powers, the State is understood to regulate through a variety of 
 152.  See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Preliminary Tribunal Award on Jurisdiction 
(UNCITRAL 1998), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ethyl-08.pdf. 
 153.  See Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Canada, Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 1, 3b-c 
(UNCITRAL 2011) (agreeing that Canada’s ban on 2, 4-D will remain in place and 
that Canada will not have to pay damages). 
 154.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712 cmt. 
g (1987) (positing that “general taxation, regulation, forfeiture . . . or other action” 
is permissible so long as it is nondiscriminatory). 
 155.  U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., EXPROPRIATION: UNCTAD SERIES 
ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II, at 79, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.7 (2012) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION]. 
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channels and in broad areas, such as protecting the environment, and 
to exercise a wide range of powers in adopting new regulations or 
enforcing existing ones vis-à-vis investors.156 
Investment tribunals accepting police powers as a defense has not 
been uniform. For example, in Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa 
Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica,157 the tribunal took a narrow 
approach to police powers, concluding that the State’s environmental 
purpose had no bearing on the issue of compensation.158 In Methanex 
Corp., the tribunal recognized the State’s police powers and held that 
the contested MTBE ban was a “lawful regulation and not an 
expropriation.”159 However, it somewhat limited the defense by 
noting that compensation would be required if “specific 
commitments had been given by the regulating government to the 
then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the 
government would refrain from such regulation.”160 Chemtura Corp. 
affirmed a broader reading of the principle of police powers. There, 
the tribunal held that Canada’s regulations phasing out the use of a 
harmful chemical, lindane, “constituted a valid exercise of 
[Canada’s] police powers” and thus did “not constitute an 
expropriation.”161 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award (Feb. 17, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 
169 (2000). 
 158.  Id. ¶ 72 (“[W]here property is expropriated, even for environmental 
purposes, whether domestic or international, the [S]tate’s obligation to pay 
compensation remains.”). 
 159.  Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on 
Jurisdiction and Merits, Part II Ch. D ¶ 15 (UNCITRAL 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf. 
 160.  Id. Part IV Ch. D ¶ 7. 
 161.  Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶ 266 (UNCITRAL Aug. 2, 2010) 
(Kluwer Law Int’l); see also Sedco v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., Award, 9 Iran-U.S. 
CTR 248, 275 (1985) (holding that it is “an accepted principle of international law 
that a State is not liable for economic injury which is a consequence of bona fide 
‘regulation’ within the accepted police power of States”); Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 119 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 158 (2004) 
(“The principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers within the 
framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its 
powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is 
undisputable”); S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award on Liability, ¶ 281 
(UNCITRAL Nov. 13, 2000) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (“The general body of precedent 
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Although tribunals have accepted varying degrees of the defense, 
police powers is a well-established concept in customary 
international law. The question in environmental disputes is which 
iteration of the doctrine a particular tribunal will apply. Moreover, 
tribunals have generally only applied the principle to non-
compensable expropriations rather than to other treaty breaches. 
Thus, tribunals must decide how to apply tools such as the “margin 
of appreciation,” discussed below, which are less established but 
may be more broadly applicable.162 
2. Margin of Appreciation 
The “margin of appreciation” doctrine was developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights as a means to balance the 
regulatory functions of the State while at the same time preserving 
the Court’s ability to review decisions.163 In investment law, the 
doctrine reflects an “increasing acceptance that the examination of 
the measures taken by the [S]tate should not be assessed too 
finely.”164 Indeed, even where the BIT is silent on the standard of 
usually does not treat regulatory action as amounting to expropriation.”). 
 162.  See VIÑUALES, supra note 3, at 377-78 (analyzing the margin of 
appreciation standard in the Methanex Corp., Glamis Gold, Ltd., and Chemtura 
Corp. decisions). 
 163.  See James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1986), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57507 (stating that the 
margin of appreciation doctrine gives States some latitude to treat parties 
differently, depending on the facts of a given situation); Handyside v. United 
Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16-17 (1976), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/ 
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499 (leaving to States a margin of appreciation to 
interpret and apply laws in force so long as they do so reasonably and in good 
faith). 
 164.  M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 467 
(3d ed. 2010). The margin of appreciation doctrine has been considered in a 
number of investment cases. See, e.g., Frontier Petrol. Services Ltd. v. Czech 
Republic, Final Award, ¶ 527 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010), http://www.italaw.com/ 
documents/FrontierPetroleumv.CzechRepublicAward.pdf (“States enjoy a certain 
margin of appreciation in determining what their own conception of international 
public policy is.”); Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 8.35 
(UNCITRAL 2012), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2853_En&caseId=C111 (“Hungary 
 would enjoy a reasonable margin of appreciation in taking such measures before 
being held to account under the ECT’s standards of protection.”); Cont’l Cas. Co. 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/09, Award, ¶ 181 (UNCITRAL 
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review or level of deference to be applied, arbitrators resist the 
impulse to review de novo a State’s assessment of a situation and 
apply the remedies as they see fit.165 
The doctrine differs from police powers in several ways.166 Unlike 
police powers, international tribunals have applied the margin of 
appreciation to all claims, not just expropriation allegations in the 
investment arbitration context.167 The theoretical underpinning for 
deferring to state action also differs: police powers are based on the 
State’s sovereign right to regulate whereas the margin of 
appreciation applies a level of review to the policy assessments of 
state agencies akin to administrative law. Accordingly, police powers 
implicate state liability under legal rules while the margin of 
appreciation is applied to factual analysis without directly impacting 
a State’s liability to pay compensation. 
Tribunals have been known to apply—implicitly or explicitly—the 
margin of appreciation in addressing the scientific process followed 
by the relevant state agency in environmental cases. For example, in 
Methanex Corp. and Glamis Gold Ltd., the tribunals “considered that 
their role was not to judge the scientific conclusions on which the 
measures challenged by the investors were based, but only the 
acceptability of the process followed to reach such conclusions.”168 
The Chemtura Corp. tribunal took a more modulated approach that 
acknowledged the presence of “highly specialized domains involving 
scientific and public policy determinations,” but noted that “[t]his is 
not an abstract assessment circumscribed by a legal doctrine about 
Sept. 5, 2008) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (affirming a State’s right to apply a “significant 
margin of appreciation” for measures taken during emergencies). 
 165.  See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 36, at 371 (stating that the 
margin of appreciation doctrine is generally triggered when a BIT lists permissible 
objectives or uses language that suggests deference is due to state parties). 
 166.  See VIÑUALES, supra note 3, at 379-80 (arguing that the ultimate 
difference between police powers and the margin of appreciation doctrine is one of 
right versus process and articulating that the former doctrine empowers the State to 
act on its “inherent duty” to protect the public and is more deferential to state 
action, while the latter concerns itself more with how a decision was reached and 
whether it was equitable). 
 167.  See, e.g., id. at 376-77 (discussing how the European Court of Human 
Rights developed the margin of appreciation doctrine in the context of claims 
involving human rights derogation). 
 168.  Id. at 377-78. 
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the margin of appreciation” and that “[i]t is an assessment that must 
be conducted in concreto.”169 On the facts of the case, the tribunal 
considered it appropriate to apply deference in its decision.170 
Other tribunals have cautiously approached the margin of 
appreciation doctrine as well. At least one tribunal has observed that 
the margin of appreciation under the European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence is “not found in customary international law or 
the [investment] [t]reaty [at issue].”171 Indeed, some scholars insist 
that the margin of appreciation is a human rights concept that has 
little or no application to investment cases.172 Yet, tribunals are 
increasingly finding themselves confronted with similar regulatory 
issues that come up in more public-oriented areas of the law. Thus, 
while not as widely accepted as police powers in international 
investment law, the margin of appreciation could offer an additional 
conceptual framework to utilize when assessing claims involving 
scientific and technical regulations. 
3. Proportionality 
Proportionality is a general legal principle and one closely 
associated with the margin of appreciation in international law. It 
refers to weighing a State’s implementation of its policy goals 
against the protected rights of an investor.173 How the tribunal 
conducts this weighing process varies. For example, a tribunal 
applying the margin of appreciation to its proportionality assessment 
 169.  Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶ 123 (UNCITRAL Aug. 2, 2010) 
(Kluwer Law Int’l). 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, 
¶ 354 (Jan. 17, 2007) (Kluwer Law Int’l). 
 172.  See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal 
Standards, 31 INT’L L. & POL. 843, 843-44 (1999) (noting that the margin of 
appreciation imbues a “state-bias” into a process that is intended to be based on 
equality); Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-
conceptualizing the Standard of Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1, 10 (2012) 
(following a private international law paradigm that affords deference to one 
disputing party but not the other could be viewed as an “arbitral heresy”). 
 173.  See generally Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health 
Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 1, 22 (2011) (arguing that generally applying the doctrine of proportionality is a 
fact-specific exercise that varies case-by-case). 
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will tip the deferential balance in favor of the State.174 
This analysis acknowledges that the investor should have the 
opportunity to show the tribunal that the state action is 
disproportionate to the State’s aim while it also considers the State’s 
factual findings underpinning the regulation from which the investor 
claims harm.175 The tribunal would accordingly undertake a factual 
proportionality assessment that carefully balances the interests 
involved, such as whether the measure falls within a recognized 
police power of the host state, the public purpose and effect of the 
measure, any potential discrimination, and the relationship between 
the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.176 Additional 
factors include the economic impact of the regulations on the 
investor and the investor’s legitimate expectations at the time of 
investment.177 
The European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence reinforces the 
“reasonable balance” to be struck between community interests and 
the private interests of alleged victims of the offending conduct.178 
Some tribunals of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes have affirmed this. For example, in Tecmed, the 
tribunal applied a proportionality analysis to distinguish between a 
compensable indirect expropriation and a non-compensable 
regulation.179 The tribunal assessed “whether such actions or 
measures are proportional to the public interest presumably protected 
thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking 
into account that the significance of such impact has a key role upon 
 174.  See id. at 23 (pointing to LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 
203 (2006), which held that States may take proportional steps to protect the public 
welfare). 
 175.  See id. at 35 (proposing that, if an investor has an opportunity to 
demonstrate a state action is not proportional, the tribunal will be better able to 
make a well-balanced analysis). 
 176.  Id. at 23, 35. 
 177.  UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 155, at 62. 
 178.  Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], “Indirect Expropriation” 
and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law 17 (Org. for Econ. 
Co-Operation & Dev. Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Working Paper No. 2004/04, 
2004), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/780155872321. 
 179.  Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 66 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 
158 (2004). 
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deciding the proportionality.”180 Similarly, in Occidental Petroleum 
Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador,181 the tribunal determined that 
proportionality is a requirement under general international law.182 
Influenced by Tecmed, the Occidental Petroleum Corp. tribunal 
determined that the “test at the end of the day will remain one of 
overall judgment, balancing the interests of the State against those of 
the individual, to assess whether the particular sanction is a 
proportionate response in the particular circumstances.”183 
Investment arbitration falls within the gray area between public 
international law, in which qualified deference to the State exists, 
and international commercial law, in which public elements of a 
dispute are not typically addressed. The key questions with these 
various doctrines therefore is how much deference is appropriate to 
grant, whether resorting to an extra-treaty standard of deference is 
appropriate and, if so, whether environmental regulation should be a 
“special case” militating towards a greater measure of deference. 
Because environmental protection involves public interest 
considerations, it may be appropriate to apply administrative 
standards of review and/or consider deferential defenses. This is 
particularly true where the State accrues no benefit or even incurs a 
loss from the action. Ultimately, these conceptual tools offer 
convenient devices for arbitral tribunals that wish to consider the 
special circumstances surrounding cases involving environmental 
issues.184 
 180.  Id. ¶ 122; see also LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 195 (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 
203 (2006) (endorsing Tecmed’s proportionality approach); Saluka Investments 
BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶¶ 305-07 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf (balancing 
 proportionality, on the one hand, and the respondent’s right to exercise police 
powers, on the other). 
 181.  ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award (Oct. 5, 2012), https://icsid.world 
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docI
d=DC2672_En&caseId=C80. 
 182.  Id. ¶ 427. 
 183.  Id. ¶ 417. 
 184.  A fourth potential defense doctrine is that of necessity or public 
emergency. While this defense has not yet been invoked in cases concerning 
environmental issues, it has been used in other contexts. See generally VIÑUALES, 
supra note 3, at 385 (“Public emergency clauses and the necessity defence have 
been invoked together in the context of a series of investment disputes relating to 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite the increasing number of cases involving the environment, 
investment treaties themselves are not well-equipped to provide 
guidance to tribunals on environmental issues. As a result, these 
issues are generally handled on a case-by-case basis with tribunals 
assessing the overall reasonableness of the state policy or regulatory 
process followed. All the while, tribunals attempt the formidable, and 
at times seemingly impossible, task of balancing the public interests 
that the State represents and the negative impact of measures on 
foreign investments. 
Despite these theoretical and structural burdens, the arbitral 
system allows for much discretion on the part of the tribunal. In the 
short term, relying on the tribunal’s use of appropriate standards of 
review and properly considering factors, such as the legitimacy of 
the State’s aim, the nature of the measure, and due process, can help 
lead to decisions that better consider environmental harm. 
Encouragingly for the long-term, States have begun to recognize the 
importance of environmental issues in their treaty negotiations.185 
Even with new treaties, however, a key question will continue to be 
how much tribunals should look at the merits of the State’s action 
rather than the process in which the policy was made. While 
indiscriminate deference is a crude tool, this article recommends that 
tribunals also avoid de novo review. Balancing these two positions 
poses a challenge for arbitrators. Ultimately, the goal for the arbitral 
system is to develop the capacity to seriously consider the public 
policy issues and environmental concerns often at stake while fairly 
adjudicating the claims of investors harmed by state action. 
the Argentine crisis of 2001-3. Although most of these cases do not concern 
environmental issues, they remain relevant to assess the potential operation of 
emergency and necessity clauses in connection with such issues.”). 
 185.  International organizations are responding to States’ interest in reforming 
the investment regime. For example, UNCTAD is supporting a coordinated and 
sustainability-oriented approach to international investment reform through its 
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development. This type of guidance 
may help expedite system reform in a way that supports environmental 
considerations. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., INVESTMENT POLICY 
FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2-3 (2012), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2012d6_en.pdf. 
 
